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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RUSSELL CATALANO

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930678-CA

Priority 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals the trial court's restitution order
entered on his guilty pleas to three burglary counts (one second
degree felony and two third degree felonies), pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), and to three theft counts (one
second degree felony, one third degree felony, and one class A
misdemeanor), pursuant to § 76-6-404 (1990).

This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (f) (Supp.
1994) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Where defendant never objected to imposing complete

restitution, has he preserved his claim that the trial court
failed to consider certain statutory factors relevant only to
determining whether to impose complete, partial, or nominal
restitution?

Because defendant did not object to imposing

complete restitution, he has waived this claim.
747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987).
1

State v. Snyder,

2.

Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support

two of the restitution amounts set by the trial court?

Defendant

has neither marshalled the evidence supporting the trial court's
determination of the amounts nor shown how the evidence fails to
support them, precluding review of this claim on its merits.
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
3.

Did the trial court properly set the restitution amount

for three items defendant stole at their original purchase price
rather than at their fair market value where there was no
evidence of their fair market value?

This Court will not disturb

the trial court's restitution order unless the trial court
exceeded its legal authority or abused its discretion.

State v.

Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) (citations
omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional
provisions, statutes, and rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one second degree felony
burglary count, eight third degree felony burglary counts, five
second degree felony theft counts, three third degree felony
theft counts, and one class A misdemeanor theft count, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 (1990) and 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 14).

Defendant pleaded guilty to the first six of the eighteen

counts charged against him: three burglary counts (one second
2

degree felony and two third degree felonies), and three theft
counts (a second degree felony, a third degree felony, and a
class A misdemeanor) (R. 47-48) . The State moved to dismiss the
other twelve counts and sought complete restitution on all of the
charged counts (R. 36, 40, 138).
The trial court sentenced defendant as follows:
1.

Counts I and V (third degree felony burglaries) and

Count II (third degree felony theft): to serve an
indeterminate prison term of 0-5 years on each count and to
pay a fine of $5,000 on each count;
2.

Count III (second degree felony burglary) and Count VI

(second degree felony theft):

to serve an indeterminate

prison term of 1-15 years on each count and to pay a fine of
$10,000 on each count;
3.

Count IV (class A misdemeanor theft): to serve a one

year prison term and to pay a fine of $2,500
(R. 55-56) . The trial court suspended execution of the sentence
and placed defendant on probation for a period of thirty-six
months upon certain terms and conditions, including that
defendant pay restitution (R. 55).
On August 17, 1993, the trial court held a restitution
hearing during which it heard evidence about the amount of each
victim's loss and determined a restitution amount for each victim
(Tr. Aug. 17, 1993).

The trial court entered an order dated

November 3, 1993 setting forth the amounts imposed, which
totalled $15,844 (R. 112-114).
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
During February, March, and April of 1992, defendant and codefendant, Daniel J. Centano, stole property consisting primarily
of tools, painting equipment, and other equipment used in home
construction (R. 1-4; Tr. Aug. 17, 1993 at 6-7, 9, 13-14, 25-28,
33-34, 70-72, 91-92).

Defendant and co-defendant stole the

property in part to equip their own business, C & C Painting (Tr.
Aug 17, 1993 at 56-57) .
Additional facts are recited in the argument sections to
which they are relevant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Failure to consider statutory factors.

Defendant

claims this Court should reverse the trial court's restitution
order because the trial court failed to consider his financial
resources and the burden restitution would impose on his family.
However, the plain language of the statute requires the court to
consider those factors only when determining whether to order
complete, partial, or nominal restitution.

Defendant never

objected to the State's representations that he had agreed to pay
complete restitution, and all of the objections he made during
the restitution hearing went to the proper calculation of
property value, not to whether he should pay something less than
complete restitution.

Therefore, defendant has waived this

claim.
2.

Sufficiency of the evidence.

Defendant complains that

the record contains insufficient evidence to support two of the
4

restitution amounts set by the trial court.

However, defendant

has neither marshalled the evidence supporting the court's
determination nor shown how the marshalled evidence fails to
justify it.

Therefore, defendant has failed to meet his

appellate burden to succeed on this claim.
3.

Calculation of restitution.

Defendant claims that the

trial court improperly ordered him to pay restitution for paint
sprayers he stole from victim Richard Valgardson at the amount
Mr. Valgardson paid to purchase them originally, arguing that the
trial court could not order him to pay anything other than their
fair market value.

The sprayers' original purchase price and

their replacement cost comprised the only evidence of their
value.

Defendant offered no evidence of their fair market value.

Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to
set the restitution amount for the sprayers at the lower original
purchase price.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation and this Court's order,
defendant supplemented the record and filed a "supplemental"
brief.

However, defendant's supplemental brief contains all of

the arguments in the original brief, and therefore appears to be
a replacement brief.

Therefore, the State will refer to and

address only the points raised defendant's second brief.

5

POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEVER OBJECTED TO IMPOSITION OF
COMPLETE RESTITUTION, HE CANNOT COMPLAIN THAT THE TRIAL
COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER FACTORS RELEVANT ONLY TO
DETERMINING WHETHER TO IMPOSE COMPLETE, PARTIAL, OR
NOMINAL RESTITUTION
Defendant first claims that the trial court failed to
consider his financial resources and the burden restitution would
impose on him even though Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (c) (Supp.
1993) required the court to do so. Appellant's Brief at 6-7. *
By its plain language, the restitution statute requires the trial
court to consider those factors in determining whether to order
restitution, and whether to order complete, partial, or nominal
restitution.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(ii) & (4)(c)(i)-

(iv) (Supp. 1993).

The statute does not require the court to

consider those factors when calculating the amount that
constitutes complete restitution.
The State represented to the trial court that it would seek
full restitution (R. 13 8) and that defendant had agreed to payfull restitution as part of the plea bargain (Tr. August 17, 1993
at 5-6). Defendant neither objected to these representations nor
otherwise claimed that he had agreed to pay something other than

1

Defendant has relied on the version of § 76-3-201 contained
in the main volume of the code, ignoring that that section was
amended in 1992 and 1993. The 1993 amendments became effective on
July 1, 1993, after defendant was sentenced, but before the trial
court held the restitution hearing and entered its order setting
the amount of restitution. 1993 Utah Laws ch. 17, §1. Although
the statutory language relevant to defendant's claims is unchanged,
the particular subsections where that language appears have been
reorganized. The State will cite to the controlling (post July 1,
1993) version of the statute.
6

complete restitution.2

At the restitution hearing, defendant's

objections went to the proper valuation of some of the stolen
property, whether the State had properly supported some of the
amounts claimed, and whether the restitution statute permitted
ordering restitution for some of the kinds of losses claimed (id.
at 21-23, 46-47, 63-66, 68, 80, 86-87, 95-96, 102, 104-105).
None of these objections has any relationship to defendant's
ability to pay.

Defendant objected only to how to calculate

complete restitution, not to whether the court should order
something less than complete restitution.
Because the factors defendant now complains the trial court
failed to consider concern only whether to order complete,
partial, or nominal restitution, and because defendant acquiesced
in ordering complete restitution, he has not preserved this
claim.

Therefore, he cannot rely on it as a basis for reversal.

State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987) (the defendant

2

The closest defendant came to making such a statement
came near the end of the restitution hearing, when he stated he
understood the plea agreement required him to pay only one-half of
the restitution. However, when the trial court explained that
there may be joint and several liability with co-defendant but that
that did not "exonerate [defendant] for the damages to these
victims," neither defendant nor defendant's counsel made any
further comment (Tr. Aug. 17, 1993 at 115-16). The trial court's
comment, along with the statements by the prosecutor established
that defendant had agreed to pay complete restitution, and neither
defense counsel nor defendant requested that the court order
something less than complete restitution. Furthermore, the record
rebuts defendant's belated statement that he thought he would be
responsible for only one-half of the restitution. In a pre-hearing
letter to the court, defendant acknowledged his responsibility to
pay restitution of approximately $13,000, the amount at which
complete restitution had been calculated prior to the hearing (R.
89) .
7

waived any challenge to the trial court's failure to enter
written findings on its restitution order by lodging no objection
to imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution
ordered).
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NEITHER MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S RESTITUTION CALCULATIONS
NOR SHOWN THAT THE MARSHALLED EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT
THE AMOUNTS AWARDED
Defendant describes Point II of the brief as a challenge to
the sufficiency of the trial court's findings to support its
"findings of restitution."

However, the substance of the

argument does not address the sufficiency of the findings at all.
Rather, defendant makes two claims in Point II: 1) that
restitution amounts ordered for victim Richard Valgardson's
stolen paint sprayers fall outside the statutory definition of
the "pecuniary damages" the trial court had the authority to
award; and 2) that some of the amounts calculated lack support in
the evidence.

Appellant's Brief at 7-8.3

3

If defendant had challenged the sufficiency of the
findings themselves, that claim would have failed for two reasons.
First, defendant failed to challenge the sufficiency of the
findings below; therefore, he has waived it for purposes of appeal.
State v. Labrum, 246 Utah Adv. R. 11, 14-15 (Utah App. 1994) (the
defendant could not challenge the trial court's lack of written
findings to support his sentence enhancement where he did not
challenge the lack of findings in the trial court). Second, the
statute requires the court to state its reasons supporting its
determination that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate; it
does not require the court to justify on the record the reasons for
setting each dollar amount. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (d) (i)
(Supp. 1993).
8

The first claim simply repeats the claim defendant raises in
Point III of his brief (that the court exceeded its sentencing
authority); the State addresses that claim in Point III of this
brief.

In the second claim, defendant alleges that the evidence

does not support the following restitution amounts ordered: 1)
$3,000 for Mr. Valgardson's losses from down-time due to
defendant's theft of his paint sprayers; and 2) $1,000 for Ray
Hernandez's losses on the subcontracting jobs he could not
perform as a result of defendant's theft of his equipment.
In order to succeed on a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a trial court determination, defendant has
the appellate burden to marshal all of the evidence supporting
that determination, then to show how the marshalled evidence
fails to support it.

State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah

App.) (considering a sufficiency challenge in the context of a
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss), cert.
denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993);

State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724,

734 (Utah App.) (considering a sufficiency challenge to a trial
court's determination that defendant had made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his right to representation), cert. denied,
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).

Defendant has done neither.

Mr. Valgardson used the paint sprayers to paint houses in
his modular home manufacturing business (Tr. Aug. 17 1993 at 3233).

The business operated on an assembly line with production

volume contributing to profits (id. at 42-43).

Mr. Valgardson

had between eighteen and twenty-six homes in various stages of
9

production at any give time, and it cost him approximately
$23,000 per day to operate his business (id. at 35, 40-41) .
Using the paint sprayers, his painters could paint a house in two
hours (id. at 41). After defendant stole the sprayers, Mr.
Valgardson's painters had to use rollers and brushes to paint the
houses, increasing the painting time to six to eight hours per
house (id.).

This delay affected other manufacturing processes;

for example, the framers could not start as many houses and the
electricians could not wire them (id. at 41-43).

Mr. Valgardson

replaced one of the three sprayers defendant stole within one
week of the theft, and the other two within six weeks, when his
cash flow permitted (id. at 37, 40-41) .
Mr. Valgardson admitted that he could not state with
certainty how much money he lost as a result of the delays the
stolen sprayers caused; however, he gave a "conservative"
estimate of $6,000 to $10,000 (id. at 42-43).

The trial court

acknowledged that Mr. Valgardson could only estimate the amount
of his down-time losses, but also acknowledged that he had
obviously suffered such losses (id. at 66-68) .

Therefore, the

court ordered $3,000 restitution for the down-time losses, only
fifty percent of Mr. Valgardson's conservative low estimate (id.
at 67-68).
Victim Ray Hernandez could not appear at the restitution
hearing (id. at 90). According to his wife, Mr. Hernandez's
losses included lost earnings from subcontracting jobs that he
could not perform without the equipment defendant stole from him.
10

Ms. Hernandez knew of three subcontracting jobs her husband
turned down because he did not have the equipment to do them and
that he made $1,700 to $2,000 per job (id at 94, 97). She also
knew that he usually had about one such job per month (id. at
97).

However, she testified that she did not know how many

subcontracting jobs her husband could have found during the year
between the time defendant stole her husband's equipment and the
time her husband replaced it, and therefore she did not know her
husband's total losses for that period (id. at 94). The court
awarded $1,000 for the profits Mr. Hernandez's lost from the
subcontracting jobs he could not obtain (id. at 117) .
Defendant marshals none of this evidence.

This failure

alone precludes reversal based on his insufficiency claim.

State

v. Gray, 851 P.2d at 1225.
Defendant also fails to show that the evidence was
insufficient to support the amounts ordered for Mr. Valgardson's
down-time and Mr. Hernandez's lost subcontracting jobs.

As to

Mr. Valgardson's down-time losses, defendant complains only that
Mr. Valgardson "speculated" about the amount.

However, defendant

provides no legal authority or analysis to establish that Mr.
Valgardson's conservative estimate cannot independently support
the restitution award or what quantum of proof was necessary.
Id.; State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (refusing
to reach the merits of an argument unsupported by legal authority
or analysis).

Cf. Fee v. State, 656 P.2d 1202, 1205-1206 (Alaska

App. 1982) (the trial court could rely on victim's testimony
11

about the amount of his losses absent any contradictory
evidence).
Similarly, defendant complains about the restitution amounts
ordered for Mr. Hernandez's lost subcontracting jobs because,
according to defendant, Ms. Hernandez testified that did not know
the amount of this loss.

Appellant's Brief at 8.

However, the

testimony on which defendant relies referred only to her
husband's subcontracting losses for the entire year (id. at 94).
She had personal knowledge of at least three jobs her husband
turned down as a result of defendant's theft of his equipment;
she also knew his subcontracting jobs usually $1,700 to $2,000
(id. at 94, 97). Therefore, she had personal knowledge of $5,100
to $6,000 in lost earnings defendant's theft caused.

This

testimony more than amply supports the trial court's $1,000
restitution order for those losses.4
In sum, defendant has neither marshalled the evidence
supporting the amounts the court ordered in restitution nor shown
how the marshalled evidence is insufficient to support those
amounts.

Therefore, he has not met his appellate burden to

succeed on this claim.

4

If anything, the trial court ordered only partial
restitution for Mr. Valgardson's down time and Mr. Hernandez's lost
subcontracting jobs.
12

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF
THE ORIGINAL PURCHASE PRICE OF STOLEN PROPERTY5
Defendant next claims that the trial court exceeded its
statutory sentencing authority by imposing restitution for the
"cost" to Mr. Valgardson of three "new" paint sprayers, when the
three sprayers defendant stole from him were used.
Brief at 7-8.

Appellant's

In substance, defendant claims the court could

only require him to pay restitution based on the fair market
value of the sprayers.

Appellant's Brief at 8.

Mr. Valgardson paid $5,935.04 when he originally purchased
the sprayers and paid approximately $7,500 to replace them (Tr.
Aug. 17, 1993 at 33-38) .

Because there is a very limited market

for sprayers, Mr. Valgardson could not state a fair market price
for sprayers of a similar age and model (id. at 35-36) .
Defendant offered no evidence of the sprayers' fair market
value.6

The trial court ordered defendant to pay the original

purchase price ($5,935.04) for the sprayers.

5

In Point III of his brief, defendant also claims that
trial court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to consider
his financial situation and the burden restitution would impose on
him.
For the reasons argued in Point I, defendant relieved the
court of that obligation by agreeing or at least not objecting to
the imposition of complete restitution.
6

One of the other victims testified he believed a used
sprayer would sell for approximately $1,500, but the record
contains no detail to establish that he was speaking of sprayers
similar to those defendant stole from Mr. Valgardson (Tr. August
17, 1993 at 30).
13

The restitution statute required the trial court to order
restitution in an amount up to double the victims' "pecuniary
damages," and defines "pecuniary damages" as "all special damages
. . . which a person could recover against defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the
defendant's criminal activities . . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

201(4)(a)(i) and (1)(c) (Supp. 1993).
In State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992), this
Court analogized a theft by deception to a conversion of the
property taken and used that theory to review the trial court's
restitution award.

Id. at 869-70.7

As this Court noted,

damages in a conversion action are calculated on the "full value"
of the property.

Id. at 870.

However, "full value" does not

always equate to fair market value.

To the contrary, a trial

court may rely on other evidence to determine value, such as the
original purchase price or the replacement cost.

Lvm v.

Thompson, 184 P.2d 667, 669-70 (Utah 1947) (in a conversion
action for stolen pipe, the supreme court rejected the
defendant's claim that the trial court should have limited the
plaintiff's recovery to a published ceiling price for used pipe,
and affirmed the trial court's reliance on the original purchase
price).

See generally Dan Dobbs, Remedies, § 5.12

(1973).

The record contains only two figures to establish the
sprayers' value: the original purchase price and the higher
7

Defendant misreads the outcome of Twitchell. Contrary to
his argument, this Court affirmed the restitution award. Id. at
868.

14

replacement cost.8

Either amount is a proper measure of their

value, and well within the double damages limit in the
restitution statute.

Therefore, the trial court reasonably

exercised its discretion when it selected the lower of the only
two amounts offered to establish the sprayers' value.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the trial court's restitution award.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of ^ % ^ ^ / - ,

1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
&

THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General

8

The only evidence defendant presented was the amount he
received when he pawned the sprayers; however, he admitted that
this did not represent their fair market value (Tr. August 17, 1993
at 53-55).
15
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ADDENDUM A

76-3-201

PUNISHMENTS

CHAPTER 3
PUNISHMENTS
Section
76-3-206.
76-3-207.

Part 2
Sentencing
Section
76-3-201.

76-3-201.2.
76-3-203.1.
76-3-203.2.

76-3-203.3.

Sentences or combination of
sentences allowed — Civil
penalties — Restitution —
Hearing — Definitions — Resentencing — Aggravation or
mitigation of crimes with
mandatory sentences.
Civil action by victim for damages
Offenses committed by three or
more persons — Enhanced
penalties.
Definitions — Use of firearm in
offenses committed on or
about school premises — Enhanced penalties.
Penalty for hate crimes — Civil
rights violation.

76-3-207.5.

Capital felony — Penalties.
Capital felony — Sentencing
proceeding.
Applicability — Effect on sentencing — Options of offenders.

Part 3
Fines and Special Sanctions
76-3-301.
Fines of persons.
Part 4
Limitations and Special Provisions on
Sentences
76-3-402.
Conviction of lower degree of offense.
76-3-404.
Presentence investigation and
diagnostic evaluation —
Commitment of defendant —
Sentencing procedure.

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing — Definitions — Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) ''Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and
medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation.
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(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) WThen a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution up to
double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or victims of
the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (c).
(b) (i) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title
77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and
is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (c).
(c) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution
that is complete, partial, or nominal under this subsection, the court shall
take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
12
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(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) (i) When the court determines that restitution is appropriate or
inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons
for the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution to the
Division of Finance.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full
hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b^ The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear warrant issued for an infraction;
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (i) applies to each
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
13

76-3-201

CRIMINAL CODE

(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and
committed to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days
of the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the
same manner as if he had not previously been sentenced, so long as
the new sentence is no greater than the initial sentence nor less than
the mandatory time prescribed by statute.
(ii) The resentencing provided for in this section shall take into
consideration the sentencing guidelines established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served.
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the
record at the time of sentencing.
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that if the defendant is released from prison he may be on
parole for a period of ten years.
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping,
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant
shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This
subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1;
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch.
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1;
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch.
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted
"consider sentencing guidelines" for "be guided
by sentencing rules" and "Commission on
Criminal and Juvenile Justice" for "Judicial
Council" in Subsection (5)(e); substituted "take
into consideration the sentencing guidelines
established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" for
"comply with the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council" in the second sentence in Subsection (6)(a); and made stylistic and punctuation
changes.
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, added Subsections (l)(e) and (f) and redesignated former Subsection (l)(e) as (l)(g);
subdivided Subsection (4)(d); substituted

"takes precedence over" for "supersedes" in
Subsection (6He); and made stylistic changes
throughout the section.
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993,
added Subsection (1), redesignating the following subsections accordingly; subdivided Subsection (3); substituted present Subsection
(4Ka)(ii) for former language requiring the
court to consider the criteria in Subsection
(3)(b) and to make the reasons for its decision a
part of the court record; deleted language relating to transportation of a defendant from Subsection (4)(b)(i); substituted "Subsection (c)" for
"Subsection (3;«b)" and deleted two sentences
now comprising Subsection (4)(d) in Subsection
(4)(b)(ii); inserted "under this subsection" in
Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d); deleted former
Subsecjtion (4), defining terms; added Subsection (5); subdivided Subsections (7Ha) and
(7Kb); and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25-1 et seq.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am Jur 2d Malicious
Mischief § 1

C.J.S. — 54 C J S Malicious or Criminal
Mischief or Damage to Property § 3
Key Numbers. — Malicious Mischief ®= 1

PART 2
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS
76-6-201. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business
therein and includes:
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or
vehicle; and
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure
or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or
privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201.

Cross-References. — Civil
entry and detainer, § 78-36-1

provisions,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am Jur 2d Burglary
§ 1
C.J.S. — 12A C.J S Burglary § 2.
A.L.R. — Maintainability of burglary
charge, where entry into building is made with
consent, 58 A L R 4th 335

What is "building" or "house" within burglary or breaking and entering statute, 68
A L R 4th 425
Key Numbers. — Burglary e=> 1

76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am Jur 2d Larceny
§ 10
C.J.S. — 52A C J S Larceny § 4
A.L.R. — What amounts to "exclusive" pos-

session of stolen goods to support inference of
burglary or other felonious taking, 51 A L R
3d 727
Key Numbers. — Larceny *» 12.

76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation.
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny
by trick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by
evidence that it was committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404
through 76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by
granting a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the
defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-403, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-403; 1974, ch. 32, § 17.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Evidence
Pleading and practice
Receiving stolen property
Evidence.
Fingerprint evidence, based on a comparison
of defendant's fingerprints with those found at
the scene of the crime, along with the testimony of defendant's accomplice, was sufficient
evidence to find defendant guilty of burglary
and theft State v Bailey, 712 P 2d 281 (Utah
1985)
Pleading and practice.
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of

theft" required to be pled by this section to invoke the provisions of consolidated theft Once
the prosecution charges a defendant with the
general offense of "theft" under § 76-6-404, it
may then present its evidence to prove the
theft was committed in any manner specified
m §§ 76-6-404 to 76-6-410 State v Fowler,
745 P 2d 472 (Utah Ct App 1987)
Receiving stolen property.
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft without the necessity
of establishing theft by taking State v Taylor,
570 P 2d 697 (Utah 1977)

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404.

Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, special anti-theft laws, §§ 41-1-105 to 14-1-121
Shoplifting Act, § 78-11-14 et seq
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tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in t h a t office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for t h e Supreme Court.
1988
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from t h e district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging t h e decisions of the
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Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
ISM
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
1966
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in any location within the state.
1986

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
when circuit and district court
merged.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative
System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Counties joining court system — Procedure — Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and
fines.
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
78-3-17.5.
Application of savings accruing to
counties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short
title.
78-3-19.
Purpose of act.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
78-3-21.5.
Data bases for judicial boards.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer — Compensation —
Duties.
78-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Salary.
78-3-24.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and responsibilities.

